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I.   Introduction
[1]  Seventy years ago, when the world was still paper-based, a famous 
lyricist wrote: “Say, it’s only a paper moon [s]ailing over a cardboard 
sea.  But it wouldn’t be make-believe [i]f you believed in me.”1  Jump to 
today’s digital world, and imagine those lines re-written in an e-mail 
from a litigator to a client: “Now, underneath each paper moon is a vast 
electronic sea.  If you plot a realist’s course you’ll cruise e-Discovery.”  
In the twentieth century, while civil litigation often wallowed in 
discovery disputes, at least paper’s one-dimensional nature provided 
several boundaries.  The expansive powers of digital media have 
shattered those outer limits.2  Thus, on a regular basis, judges, litigators, 
clients, and technologists have been forced to explore and test new 
methods of fair, thorough, and efficient requests for, and production of, 
electronic information. 
[2]  In days gone by: 
•  Discoverable information existed primarily or exclusively in 
printed hardcopy documents, whose content and history were, for 
all intents and purposes, fixed and unalterable.3   
•  Other than the document’s printed contents and oral 
questioning of authors and/or recipients, there was no opportunity 
to explore areas such as the timing and content of prior revisions 
or the identities of recipients of each such version. 
•  However large a paper dump ensued, relatively speaking there 
were finite sets of discoverable materials4 to be collected, 
reviewed and produced, on the one hand,  and requested, obtained 
and reviewed, on the other hand.5
[3]  Yet, in a modern civil lawsuit: 
•  Discoverable information exists in a wide array of electronic 
formats that typically contain much non-printed information, 
known as “metadata,”6 namely particulars that are unavailable 
when one merely looks at a hardcopy.  Metadata mining may be 
most fruitful as to e-mail.  However, even in commonly and widely 
used formats such as Microsoft Word, electronic versions of 
documents can reveal many types of underlying information.7
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•  Technology has made it possible, and in many instances easy, to 
uncover additional potentially helpful facts.  Those facts can flesh 
out the context of a document, encompassing, for example, timing 
and content of prior revisions, identities of recipients of each such 
version, and/or identities of prior recipients taken out of a 
distribution loop.8
•  The size of most every corporate party’s discoverable data set is 
very expansive and often infinite.9
[4]  Consequentially, in comparison to their predecessors, the twenty-first 
century litigator and client are faced with two much more daunting tasks.  
Fulfilling the goals of those two tasks entails steering clear of two sea 
mines: 
•  Assessing one’s own potentially huge data set in a thorough, 
cost-effective, and pristine-condition-preserving matter, without 
being - or seeming to be - obstructionist. 
•  Extracting, exploring and culling key information from a data 
set entirely under the control of one’s opponent, without being - or 
seeming to be - on a “drag the ocean” fishing expedition. 
[5]  Litigators and technologists are still wrestling with how to engage in 
electronic discovery while evading those two e-Discovery analogues to 
Scylla and Charybdis.10  Judges have been increasingly focused on 
developing a growing body of e-Discovery case law, which will ultimately 
propound a tried and true process.11  To be efficient and effective, that 
process must mandate and enforce cooperation among the litigants as to 
search terms and other selection criteria needed to narrow down huge data 
sets into manageable subsets.  
II. An Electronic Wave Has Engulfed Civil Litigation
A. Our Digital World12 
[6]  In the world in general, 99.99% of information being generated is in 
non-printed form.13  E-mail usage and electronic file generation are at 
astounding levels.14  While estimates vary, last year one well-respected 
scholarly institute, The Sedona Conference,15 opined that “70[%] of 
corporate records may be stored in electronic format, and 30[%] of 
electronic information is never printed to paper.”16  One expert 
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commentator went even further, contending that, in most companies, 90 to 
95% of information is stored only in electronic form.17
[7]  In turn, broad discovery remains paramount in civil litigation.18  Not 
surprisingly, therefore, in the litigation context, the transition to a 
predominantly electronic mode has been accelerating at a rapid pace.19  
Black letter law is now to the effect that e-information is as susceptible to 
discovery rules and principles as paper.20  “[I]f a party chooses an 
electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method 
is an ordinary and foreseeable risk” of commercial litigation.21   
B. Categories of Electronic Information  
[8]  Hard drives, back-up tapes, storage devices, web server logs, 
databases, and “deleted” 22 files are among the numerous formats and 
environments that often need to be navigated.23  The best judicial 
description of the world of electronic information was propounded last 
year by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin in the first of her several landmark 
electronic discovery decisions in an employment discrimination case, 
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (“Zubulake I”).24  As its threshold issue in 
assessing Plaintiff’s motion to compel production, Zubulake I divided the 
world of electronic information into two distinct broad categories: 
1)  “[D]ata that is kept in an accessible format,” broken down into 
three sub-categories, “listed in order from most accessible to least 
accessible:” 
a) “Active, online data,” such as hard drives;  
b) “Near-line data,” such as optical disks; and 
c) “Offline storage/archives[,] . . . [which] lack[] ‘the 
coordinated control of an intelligent disk subsystem,’ and 
[consist of], in the lingo, JBOD (‘Just a Bunch of 
Disks’).”25
2) “Electronic data [that] is relatively inaccessible,” broken down 
into two sub-categories, also ranked in order of accessibility: 
a) “Backup tapes;” and 
b) “Erased, fragmented or damaged data.”26  
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C. Costs of Retrieving Electronic Information
[9]  The significance of the two Zubulake I categories is that they 
comprise a framework for coping with the all-important civil discovery 
issue of spiraling costs.27  Zubulake I concluded that “in the world of 
electronic data, thanks to search engines, any data that is retained in a 
machine[-]readable format is typically accessible”28 and thus, if 
responsive, must be produced at the expense of the producing party, under 
the usual rules of discovery.29  On the other hand, as to inaccessible data 
(primarily back-up tapes), Zubulake I held that “[a] court should consider 
cost-shifting,” namely requiring the requesting party to shoulder some of 
the burden of retrieval costs.30
[10]  Back-up tapes trigger a host of fairness and cost issues, and Zubulake 
I did its best to fairly assess these issues from the perspective of both 
sides.  What are back-up tapes, and why do they warrant disparate 
treatment?31  As a medium, a back-up tape drive is “[a] device, like a tape 
recorder, that reads data from and writes it onto a tape.  Tape drives have 
data capacities of anywhere from a few hundred kilobytes to several 
gigabytes.”32  As a practical matter, companies make daily or weekly 
computer system data back-ups,33 to have on hand in case of a catastrophic 
system crash.  Typically, those back-up tapes are retained for a week, a 
month, or a similar period of time, and then are put back into rotation and 
recycled.34  Each back-up takes a snapshot of the information on the 
computer system at a given time.  When subsequent back-up tapes are 
made, previously created back-up tapes may be recycled or deleted from 
the storage facility. 
[11]  Although the cost of back-up tapes themselves is relatively small, the 
cost of restoring, reviewing, and extracting responsive information from 
them can run into tens of thousands of dollars.35  Typically, there is no 
directory; thus, only once back-up tapes are “restored” and the contents 
indexed can the underlying information be searched, extracted, and/or 
manipulated.36  Given that backed up data must not only be indexed but 
also decompressed, the restoration process is typically lengthy and 
costly.37
[12]  As acknowledged by Judge Scheindlin in Zubulake I, the stakes are 
thus higher all the way around regarding back-up tapes and other 
“relatively inaccessible” data.  Consequently, her decision tried to give full 
credence to the positions of both requesting and producing parties. 
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[13]  As to requesting parties, Zubulake I potentially opened a can of 
worms by rebuffing a once common objection to discoverability of back-
up tapes.  The accessibility/inaccessibility demarcation eliminated “the 
purposes for which the responding party maintains the requested data” as a 
factor in a new seven-factor cost-shifting analysis.38  Further, “[w]hether 
the data is kept for a business purpose or for disaster recovery does not 
affect its accessibility.”39  Zubulake I also carefully protected the rights of 
individual Plaintiffs/requestors by generally circumscribing when costs 
can be shifted to the requesting party. 40  It did so by ruling that cost-
shifting is appropriate as to restoration of inaccessible data only if its 
marginal utility is evinced by a “fact-intensive” review of the results of a 
“small sample” restoration.41 
[14]  As to producing parties, Zubulake I and its follow-up decision, 
Zubulake III,42 carefully restricted the extent to which the arena of back-up 
tapes could become a bottomless sinkhole for a responding party.  In 
Zubulake I, the new test was applied to a narrow pertinent set of ninety-
four43 back-up tapes that had previously been identified as responsive.  
The court ordered Defendant to produce at its own expense “all responsive 
e-mails that exist on its optical disks or on its active servers[,] . . . [and] 
responsive e-mails from any five backups [sic] tapes selected by 
[Plaintiff].”44  The court also ordered Defendant to “prepare an affidavit 
detailing the results of its search, as well as the time and money spent.  
After reviewing the contents of the backup tapes and [Defendant]’s 
certification, the Court [was to] conduct the appropriate cost-shifting 
analysis.”45  In Zubulake III, the court held that the results of the 
restoration of the small sample of five tapes warranted shifting to the 
requesting party only 25% of restoration costs as to the remaining tapes, 
and that all other costs - including the costs of review and production - 
remained with the producing party.46 
[15]  Implicitly, the Zubulake decisions laid the groundwork for 
development of a conceptually sound, pragmatic, and cost-sensitive multi-
step e-Discovery process, namely a process in which there are incentives 
for both sides to cooperate with each other and with the court.  
Significantly, the Zubulake opinions did so in the battleground of back-up 
tapes, the key factual setting that has instigated many other judges to wade 
into the e-Discovery waters.47 
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D. What Litigants Hope to Find: Smoking Guns 
[16]  An ironic factual aspect of Zubulake was Plaintiff’s packrat-like 
tendency to retain many paper copies of e-mails.  Plaintiff “produced over 
450 pages of relevant e-mails, including e-mails that would have been 
responsive to her discovery requests but were never produced by 
[Defendant].”48  That fact played a major role in convincing the court to 
agree with Plaintiff that Defendant likely had additional pertinent e-mails 
in relatively inaccessible electronic form.  In particular, Zubulake I 
reasoned that Plaintiff “ha[d] already produced a sort of ‘smoking gun’ - 
an e-mail suggesting that she be fired ‘ASAP’ after her EEOC charge was 
filed, in part so that she would not be eligible for year-end bonuses.”49 
[17]  As in Zubulake, in general a requesting party seeks to fulfill the 
overall discovery goal of developing evidence to support a claim or 
defense.  Likewise, it also hopes to uncover the proverbial “smoking gun” 
e-mail or other document.  As one commentator so aptly pointed out: 
Once discovery begins, the chase is on for 
smoking gun e-mails, memos admitting 
liability, deleted design documents, and 
other documents never intended to see the 
light of day. . . .  It has been proven time and 
time again that e-mails are fertile ground for 
unearthing damaging documents.  
Individuals believe them to be private 
communication.50 
Based on some widely publicized examples,51 hope springs external as to 
unearthing gold nuggets.  In one of the fen-phen diet drug litigations, a 
Plaintiff’s computer forensics experts uncovered a damaging e-mail 
message, which was ultimately leaked to the press.52  The message is 
universally claimed to have read: “Do I have to look forward to my waning 
years writing checks to fat people with a silly lung problem?”53  Similarly, a 
Chevron Corporation subsidiary was apparently induced to settle a sexual-
harassment claim - in 1995 for $2.2 million - based on unearthed evidence 
that included an e-mail containing such jokes as “[twenty-five] reasons beer 
is better than women.”54  Generally, such smoking gun e-mails would 
remain hidden absent an automated method to retrieve them. 
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III. Different Methods of Production and Review 
A. Paper vs. Electronic 
[18]  When a very small set of discoverable information exists, it is still 
feasible for the parties to physically review printed hard copies of all 
documents.  In fact, when one’s client’s responsive set and/or the other 
side’s produced set is quite small, some feel that paper review is advisable, 
even when it is in addition to one or more forms of electronic review.  
Why?  In those situations, the “serendipity factor” applies, meaning that 
the odds are at their highest that paper review may reveal pertinent 
information that might be missed in robotic electronic review.55 
[19]  Even when a lawsuit entails a medium to large e-information 
universe, there is not necessarily relevant, let alone earth-shattering, 
metadata.56  As has always been the case, the nature and extent of 
permissible discovery vary widely, depending on factors such as legal 
theories, types of parties, and number of key players.  However, in almost 
every lawsuit, the sheer volume of potentially responsive e-information 
has changed the tools needed just to get through the data set.57  
[20]  In almost all current civil litigation involving one or more entity 
parties, the nature of the beast now mandates that electronic collection, 
production, and review predominate, and often constitute the only 
effective method.58  An experienced practitioner has propounded a rule of 
thumb: “[i]n any matter involving more than [one] gigabyte of data, or 
more than 100,000 pages59 of documentation, lawyers should consider e-
[D]iscovery processes.”60  
[21]  In many lawsuits, the vastness of the potentially responsive set of 
electronic information61 has made it practically impossible for the 
litigation team to review hardcopy documents page-by-page.  The 
Zubulake I court noted that, “‘[b]y comparison [to the time it would take 
to search through 100,000 pages of paper], the average office computer 
could search all of th[ose] documents for specific words or combinations 
of words in minute [sic], perhaps less.’”62  In the author’s own experience, 
a complex litigation between two large corporate parties can generate the 
equivalent of more than one hundred million pages of discovery 
documents, requiring over twenty terabytes of server storage space. 63  
Assuming a review rate of one box of paper documents64 per weekday, per 
reviewer, a one hundred million page volume corresponds to over thirty 
person-years of review for each party.   In ecological terms, each side 
would require approximately 6,250 trees65 just to print one copy of each of 
the documents it produced and of each of the documents it received. 
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B. Inappropriateness of Seeking, or Turning Over, “Everything”
[22]  Given the open-ended nature of data storage capacities, electronic era 
descendants of the old-fashioned fishing expedition and paper-dump are 
fraught with problems for both sides.  An overly broad request by the 
propounding party will likely be both too intrusive on the responding 
party, and indefensible in court if enforcement is sought, thus causing the 
requester to lose not only time and money, but also credibility with the 
judge.66
[23]  An overly broad response by the producing party is also a double-
edged sword.  Getting buried in an avalanche of data could render it 
impossible for the requester to conduct any meaningful, let alone 
complete, review.67  Moreover, if electronic information is produced in its 
various respective “native”68 formats, much of it may be impractical (or 
impossible) to view, let alone review.69  However, turning over an overly 
broad set of data, especially in its native format(s), is not a tenable strategy 
for a producing party because it, in effect, “gives away the store” in the 
first instance.  To the extent the other side has the requisite resources and 
is sufficiently tech-savvy to explore the pertinent native files, each such 
“native document appears exactly as it appeared to the custodian who 
created and maintained the document[;] . . . [thus, one’s opponent would 
be able to] see all of the application’s hidden features, such as spreadsheet 
formulas, tracked changes and links between documents.”70
C. Searching
[24]  The pivotal “selection criteria”71 issue has been aptly framed by one 
Sedona Conference law-and-technology expert, who queried, “is the use 
of Selection Criteria a reasonable and reliable way to identify and cull 
potentially responsive data from large, co-mingled, general-issue, data 
sets?”72  The same expert defined the Sedona Principle Eleven phrase 
“selection criteria” as “filtering expressions . . . applied . . . to identify data 
items with specific characteristics.  Those items . . . that match . . . are 
deemed to have ‘hits’ and will be selected, or culled, from the data set for 
further processing and/or review.”73
[25]  The most effective criteria for winnowing down a large universe of 
electronic information could include full-text word searches, time 
frame(s), file type(s), and/or key creators or modifiers of documents.74  
Though there are deficiencies,75 technology is always changing, such that 
the capabilities and capacities of search engines continue to grow.76
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[26]  No sophisticated party or attorney seriously contends that an 
electronic vetting process is unnecessary.  The trickier issue, however, is 
whether - and, if so, when - a propounding party gains input into the 
responding party’s selection criteria.  Responding parties will tend to insist 
on the right to “go it alone” in the first instance, while requesting parties 
will want to have input ab initio.77  
IV. Suggested Solution: Bilateral/Cooperative Approach 
From Litigation’s Inception to Conclusion
A. Introduction
[27]  As recognized by The Sedona Principles, “dialogue between litigants 
is a prerequisite to resolving (or avoiding) potentially costly and disruptive 
electronic discovery disputes.”78  The prospect of such bilateral 
cooperation becomes real rather than a pipe dream as long as one accepts 
the following premises and presumptions: 
•  Many broad generalizations cannot be applicable to every 
litigation.  A lawsuit - however unique its facts and legal theories - 
is always intrinsically a dispute between parties whose counsel are 
hired to vigorously advocate, which includes using strategy.79  
•  The Zubulake marginal utility approach will be used to prevent 
fishing expeditions into inaccessible data such as back-up tapes, 
and the court will induce the parties to cooperate on search criteria 
at all three phases of the Zubulake framework.80
•  When an individual is litigating against a company, the trial 
judge will strive to ensure that justice is served.81
•  Where necessary to protect privileged material,82 trade secrets 
and the like, the trial judge will work with the parties to establish 
protocols for data gathering and review, including, perhaps, 
appointing a neutral computer expert.83
•  All concerned, including computer experts, will employ the best 
technology practices to ensure that original electronic information 
is not manipulated and that the integrity of working copies thereof 
is preserved.84
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[28]  With those principles accepted as starting points, it is time to touch 
on the most recent proposed standards and rules aiming for a cooperative 
e-Discovery process. 
B. Overview of Pending Proposed Rule Changes & 
Recommendations
[29]  The same long-held discovery law principles apply to electronic 
information.85  However, judicial interpretation of those principles in the 
variegated factual contexts wrought by technological advances has been 
slow.   Some of that slowness is due to judges’ predilection to adhere to 
their traditional role of “develop[ing] principles on a case-by-case basis 
from the ground up.”86  As in other contexts, there are four reasons why 
we will all get very old if we wait for the adjudicative process to finish 
that task.  First, “[m]ost reported discovery cases come from trial courts 
and have little precedential value.”87  Second, there is generally very little 
guidance from courts of appeals, because few discovery cases get 
appealed.88  Third, when such cases are appealed, the level of appellate 
review is deferential, leaving most discovery determinations within the 
discretion of the trial judge.89  Fourth, the reported decisions tend to 
involve obstructionist conduct at the most egregious end of the spectrum, 
90 thus arguably offering insufficient guidance to those acting in a 
mainstream manner. 
[30]  There are several current movements to establish new standards that 
could provide some much-needed guidance in the e-Discovery arena.  At 
the federal level, the Discovery Subcommittee of the United States 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (FRCP Committee) is assessing 
whether the nuances of electronic information warrant proposed 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP).91  Many 
question whether the “three-to[-]four-year process” endemic to revising 
the FRCP92 can possibly keep up with technological advances.93   Even the 
FRCP Committee itself has acknowledged a “legitimate concern that any 
definition we fix upon presently could be rendered meaningless by 
changes in five or ten years.  The goal of this effort is to try to use terms 
that anticipate technological developments and would be sufficiently 
flexible to be of use once those occur.”94
[31]  Nonetheless, the current draft of the proposed FRCP changes does 
tackle a number of key technology topics, such as: 
•  contemplating adding a provision to FRCP 34(1)(A) - as to 
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scope of discovery - that might encompass metadata;95
•  amending FRCP 34(b)(1)(B) - as to “form of the request” - to 
include that “[t]he request may specify the form in which 
electronically-stored data are to be produced,”96 ostensibly 
including metadata; and 
•  considering authorizing a “quick peek” - in other words, “initial 
examination” - procedure in FRCP 34(b)(2)(E), whereby a party 
would preliminarily turn over electronic information to its 
adversary without waiving any privilege objections.97
Three of the Sedona Conference’s eleven Principles - Three, Six 
and Eleven - address aspects of narrowing the scope of e-Discovery.  
Principle Three provides that “[p]arties should confer early in discovery 
regarding the preservation and production of electronic data and 
documents when these matters are at issue in the litigation and seek to 
agree on the scope of each party’s rights and responsibilities.”98  Principle 
Six, in essence, advises against standard procedures covering “the role of 
forensic-style data retrieval and analysis procedures in civil discovery.”99  
In short, Principle Six warns that “the precise methods, or choice of 
vendor or consultant, should not be dictated by the court.”100   
[32]  Sedona Principle Eleven particularly addresses “data sampling, 
searching, or the use of selection criteria.”101  Though that Principle 
authorizes the responding party’s harvesting of its own data set, it also 
prescribes that this culling be conducted in the spirit of fulfilling the “good 
faith obligation to preserve and produce potentially responsive electronic 
data and documents.”102  And, by way of an important qualification, the 
corresponding Observation “recommend[s], however, that methodology be 
discussed by the parties before the searches begin, most likely at the Rule 
26(f) conference.  This recommendation follows Principle [Three] and 
might serve to diffuse potential disputes, avoiding unnecessary duplication 
and costs.”103
[33]  Also weighing in is the Task Force on Electronic Discovery of the 
Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association (ABA), which has 
circulated for public comment a draft set of proposed amendments to the 
ABA’s Civil Discovery Standards.104  Many of that task force’s proposals 
espouse ways that the parties can vet large sets of electronic information 
so as to more efficiently and fairly tackle huge amounts of data.105  
Moreover, on the “quick peek” issue, several of the ABA Standards’ other 
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proposals suggest three stipulated methods by which parties could produce 
large data sets likely containing some potentially privileged material 
without actually waiving privilege.106
[34]  The aptness of the recommendations of these various bodies is 
buttressed by the case studies in inefficiency discussed in Part IV(D)(4) 
below. 
C. Policies Favoring/Inducing Cooperation
[35]  In addition to the incentive to join forces in attempting to 
conquer the overwhelming amounts of data discussed in Part II(A) 
above, there are other factors militating in favor of cooperation. 
 1. Idealistic Principles
[36]  Attorneys are expected to cooperate during the discovery 
process.  First, professional responsibility requires attorneys to 
offer one another at least some level of cooperation.107  Second, in 
theory, “information contained in electronic records can help the 
company’s position in a legal proceeding just as easily as it can be 
harmful.”108  As a result, a thorough search for electronic evidence 
is in the company’s best interest.  The author’s experience as a 
litigator has generally borne out that theory.  Typically a dispute 
that proceeds into a lengthy discovery phase entails many facts that 
are not cut and dry and are thus susceptible to varying 
interpretations and depictions.   As a result, it tends to be better for 
all sides to learn the full range of direct and circumstantial 
evidence that truly exists for claim building, defense building, and 
potential settlement assessment purposes. 
2. Specter of Sanctions
[37]  Even putting aside the carrot of the idealistic principles of 
ethics and truth-seeking, there is a new stick.  Increasingly, tech-
savvy judges have become much tougher on parties who, ostrich-
like, refuse to cooperate in electronic discovery.109  Judges have 
begun to lose their patience with recalcitrant parties, both 
discovery requesters (propounders) and discovery responders 
(producers).   While the vast majority of reported e-Discovery 
decisions focus on wayward producers, several recent appellate 
decisions have restrained propounders by preventing them from 
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making vague requests and gaining unfettered access to an 
opponent’s electronic information. 110  
[38]  “‘[T]hat parties need to work together from the beginning, conferring 
with each other as often as necessary so that appropriate material is 
produced at reasonable times’” is the take-away from a relatively recent 
reversal of a Plaintiff’s jury verdict.111  The Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp. reinforces the 
judicial trend to scrutinize companies’ protestations that they cannot 
recover data stored on back-up tapes.112  There, the appellate court found 
that the trial court had not adequately dissected Plaintiff’s months of 
protestations concerning purported technical difficulties in recovering e-
mails from the critical time period at issue.  Those contentions, which 
continued past the start of trial, were rendered quite suspicious by 
Defendant’s consultant’s ability to recover 950,000 e-mails from the 
pertinent time period in four days.113   
[39]  The range of sanctions for a producing party who will not cooperate 
or otherwise meet its discovery obligations is very broad, including 
“monetary penalties (such as attorney fees, costs and/or pay-for-proof 
sanctions), exclusion of evidence; adverse inference jury instructions, and, 
in an appropriately extreme case, even a dismissal or default judgment.”114  
In Residential Funding Corp., the Second Circuit analyzed the requisite 
“culpable state of mind” to encompass not only “bad faith” or “gross 
negligence,” but also ordinary negligence.115  A few months later, a 
Southern District of New York judge went even farther in Metropolitan 
Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees 
International Union.116  There, the misconduct was so extreme117 that 
Judge Loretta A. Preska granted “Plaintiff’s motion for [final] judgment as 
to liability against [D]efendants and for . . . attorneys’ fees necessitated by 
the discovery abuse[s] by [D]efendants and their counsel.”118  
Metropolitan Opera Ass’n relied on FRCP 37,119 28 U.S.C. § 1927,120 and 
a court’s inherent power to sanction as the justifications for the lawsuit’s 
ultimate “result [being] driven by discovery abuse,” rather than by 
resolution “on the merits.”121
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D. Collaborative Vetting Process Needed at all Litigation 
Stages122
1. Rule 26(f) Initial Discovery Conference
[40]  An early dialogue among the parties as to the logistics of electronic 
discovery is likely necessary to assure compliance with FRCP 26(f),123 
especially in an action in which electronic information is likely to be 
significant.124  Rule 26(f) provides in pertinent part that “the parties must, 
as soon as practicable and in any event at least [twenty-one] days before a 
scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under [FRCP] 
16(b), confer . . . to develop a proposed discovery plan.”  As one federal 
district court judge pointed out in 2002: 
In the electronic age, this [Rule 26(f)] meet 
and confer should include a discussion [of] 
whether each side possesses information in 
electronic form, whether they intend to 
produce such material, whether each other’s 
software is compatible, whether there exists 
any privilege issue requiring redaction, and 
how to allocate costs involved with each of 
the foregoing.125
[41]  The recent proposals have all focused on beefing up the e-Discovery 
aspect of the Rule 26 conference.126  Consistent with Sedona Principle 
Three, e-Discovery issues such as selection criteria should be covered in 
the course of satisfying the FRCP 26(f) meet and confer obligation as well 
as in initial disclosures.127  ABA Draft Standard 31(a)(i)-(xiii) mandates 
that “the initial discovery conference” address all e-Discovery, 
encompassing thirteen sub-topics such as “subject matter,” “time period,” 
likely sources, “accessibility of the potentially responsive data,” and “the 
potentially responsive data” and its likely “platforms.”128  Likewise, a draft 
proposed addition to FRCP 26(f) would require the parties to address 
electronic discovery issues and related waiver-of-privilege concerns at the 
conference.129  A proposed note to accompany that new provision would 
specifically reference “search protocol” as a discussion topic.130
2. 30(b)(6) Deposition of Computer System Administrator  
[42]  Assuming that the location and/or amount of an opponent’s computer 
data are important and have only been preliminarily delineated in the 
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initial discovery conference and in initial disclosures, there is a logical 
next step, in which both parties should engage openly and in good faith.  
Under FRCP 30(b)(6),131 a party should notice the deposition(s) of one or 
more person(s) with knowledge, such as the Information Technology (IT) 
Director.  The federal magistrate who decided McPeek I and McPeek II 
has stated for attribution that “‘[t]he first deposition you take in any case 
should be the system administrator of your opponent.’”132  In addition, 
ABA Draft Standard 31(a)(iv) contemplates as much by providing for the 
identification of one or more IT persons with knowledge at the initial 
discovery conference.133
[43]  Questions might cover issues such as “hardware, software, software 
applications, [system] back-ups, e-mail and voicemail administration.”134  
Many outlines of sample questions for IT 30(b)(6) depositions and for 
other types of e-Discovery questions (for depositions as well as 
interrogatories and requests for production) are readily available on the 
web.135
3. Throughout the Rest of the Discovery Process: 
[Pre-Production] Collaboration on Searching/Vetting 
[44]  Each of the three pending sets of recommendations discussed in Part 
IV(B) above encourages that, in “meet and confer” conferences throughout 
a lawsuit, the parties focus on reaching agreements as to winnowing 
criteria.136  Regardless of the specific standards that will be implemented 
by future rules, as a practical matter, the sooner in discovery that the 
parties cooperate on the searching/culling/vetting process, the better.  
Early collaboration gives the parties the best odds of avoiding return 
tickets to court to repeatedly revisit the same issues.    
[45]  Requesting parties tend to push for opportunities for early input, 
contending that a responding party’s inherent bias will infect the integrity 
of unilateral choices regarding search criteria.  Propounders can raise a 
number of legitimate concerns about ceding to the responding party the 
exclusive right to identify the discoverable universe.  First, there are the 
dual specters of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness.  Second, 
there is often an inequality of information, meaning that the requesting 
party may know nothing, or next to nothing, about the format, size or 
content of the responding party’s data’s.  This concern is arguably 
heightened in fraud, employment discrimination, intellectual property 
infringement, and trade secret usage cases.  Third, though search engines 
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have gotten more and more advanced, the tools chosen by a responding 
party may have deficiencies.137
[46]  If producing parties objectively chose broad, “defensible” search 
criteria from the get-go, then requesting parties would not keep clamoring 
for early input into the selection process.138  Aside from zealous advocacy, 
producing parties can point to legitimate reasons for their own right to cull 
in the first instance, such as:  
• protection of privileged and confidential materials;  
• maintenance of discovery’s scope within appropriate legal 
boundaries; and  
• utilization of search criteria to cull responsive electronic 
information is an antidote for the futility  of producing a data 
set too large to be physically reviewed.139   
In short, the producing party will contend that, if it is proceeding in good 
faith under the standards of Sedona Principles Three, Six and Eleven, its 
own vetting process will be a remedy for, instead of an enabler of, 
obfuscation.   
[47]  Whatever happens initially, at some subsequent point in discovery, a 
producing party is likely to acknowledge the inevitable futility of utter 
unilateralism; then, it thus “may want to consider entering into discussions 
with the opposing party regarding specific selection criteria to be used in 
subsequent searches of the electronic data set.  While this is not always 
possible or advantageous, there are situations when such a dialogue can 
eliminate needless disputes . . . .”140  A bilateral/multi-lateral process does 
not just aid the propounding party.  The longer the producing party waits 
to accept the inexorable need for a discourse, the less credibility141 that 
party will have in its future discussions with the other side and with the 
court.  In addition, a joint plan puts fair pressure on the requestor to be 
more focused and particular from the outset.  That pressure is, and should 
be, even greater as to inaccessible data such as back-up tapes.  
Significantly, the first Zubulake factor (comprising half of the marginal 
utility analysis) is “the extent to which the request is specifically tailored 
to discover relevant information.”142  But the trade-off is that a requesting 
party that has done its homework can get at the information it needs 
without going on a fishing expedition. 
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4. Case Studies in Lack of Cooperation (McPeek and Tulip)
[48]  In the hearing resulting in the Zubulake III opinion, the parties 
returned to court within only two months, pursuant to the court’s well-
thought out, but brand new, three-step process in which “small sampling” 
review had been the second step.  However, in some prior cases, without 
the guidance of the Zubulake framework, a similar process was very 
prolonged due to contentiousness between the parties. 
[49]  In the first round of the McPeek retaliation case (McPeek I), the court 
ordered partial restoration of back-up tapes, but only to the extent that 
those tapes contained e-mails to and from Plaintiff’s supervisor during the 
key one year period.143  Almost a year and a half later, after the search and 
resultant review were complete, the parties returned to court.  The two 
sides vehemently disagreed in their characterizations of the results.  On the 
one hand, Plaintiff contended that the search had “produced useful, 
relevant information that justifie[d] a second search of backup tapes for 
certain periods . . . [that would] not be that difficult or expensive given 
what the first search accomplished.”144  On the other hand, Defendant 
“insist[ed] that the first search only produced [cumulative] documents  . . .  
[and] a second search would be expensive and time consuming.”145  The 
magistrate judge assessed the likelihood that the back-up tapes would 
contain word processing documents and/or e-mail messages that would 
produce relevant information.  Then, he denied a request for additional 
searches as to three of the four key people at issue, but granted the request 
as to the fourth person.146  
[50]  Impasses like the one in McPeek can lead to delay as well as 
expenditures of much time and money on repetitive scope-of-discovery 
issues.  Such stalemates are even more vexatious when the responding 
party’s unwillingness to cooperate is obstructionist to the degree that the 
court has to get involved and order cooperation on search parameters.147  A 
classic example is Tulip Computers International B.V. v. Dell Computer 
Corp.,148 a PC components patent infringement case that settled at the trial 
stage late last summer, after years of discovery skirmishes.  There were 
five discovery problem areas, many aspects of which surfaced relatively 
early in the litigation. 
[51]  In Tulip Computers, for months after receiving Plaintiffs’ requests 
for production (RFP’s), Defendant Dell contended that there was no way 
to search the pertinent electronic information.  It took until nine months 
after service of the RFP’s for Dell to disclose that its off-site storage 
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contained 44,000 boxes of documents and many back-up tapes.149  Dell 
ultimately offered access to some electronic documents kept in the 
ordinary course of business in its “data warehouse.”150  As to those data 
warehouse documents, Dell initially imposed many restrictions (including 
search/data fields), but then softened its stance, so that Plaintiffs and its e-
Discovery consultant Ontrack could adequately search for, and extract, the 
sought-after information.151
[52]  An irresolvable dispute lingered as to e-mails that Dell contended 
could never be responsive.  The court granted Plaintiffs’ customized 
request that Dell make its senior executives’ e-mail records available to 
Plaintiffs after having an opportunity to address privilege and 
confidentiality concerns. 152  As part of the rationale for allowing Plaintiffs 
to ascertain for themselves the accuracy of Dell’s representations that all 
responsive documents had been produced, the court cited Dell’s history of 
obfuscations and stonewalling.153   
[53]  Plaintiffs’ proposed procedure—including collaboration on 
searching—was deemed “fair, efficient, and reasonable.”154  Defendant 
had to “provide the e-mails from the hard disks of the identified executives 
in electronic form to [Plaintiffs’ consultant,]” who would “search the e-
mails based on an agreed upon list of search terms.”155  Plaintiff was 
directed to give Defendant a list of e-mails containing those terms, but was 
not to read the e-mails until Defendant had an opportunity to review them 
to ensure that privilege and confidentiality concerns were not 
compromised.156  After some more months of discovery disputes, the case 
stumbled along toward its ultimate eve-of-trial settlement.157
V.   Conclusion
[54]  Litigants are advised to cooperate early and often in the battle against 
the common enemy, a huge fluid body of electronic information.  
Proposed rule changes and recent decisions dot the horizon, providing 
buoys and beacons to steer litigants and litigators on their journey.  Yet, in 
the final analysis, these distant guides are insufficient to assist the parties 
in reaching their final destination expeditiously and safely.  The nature of 
discovery and the complexities of electronic information militate in favor 
of bilateral programming of the figurative Global Positioning System.  
Absent cooperation in seeking a finite set of mutually agreeable 
destinations, the parties are likely to end up adrift at sea together. 158  They 
may even end up in a small sinking skiff, roaming an unbounded ocean, 
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bailing water in a futile attempt to avoid being swept under by “the great 
shroud of the [electronic] sea.”159
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Evidence, in 2 SEVENTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 649, 656 (Practising Law 
Institute 2003) (including a limited glossary); Joan E. Feldman, Standard Definitions, 
Computer Forensics Inc., at http://www.forensics.com/pdf/Standard_Definitions.pdf 
(2001); Richard A. Lazar, THE GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 37-44 (Fios, Inc. 
2002), available at http://www.fiosinc.com/simplified/register.html (subscription 
required) (including a glossary of electronic discovery terms) (on file with Richmond 
Journal of Law & Technology). 
24 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 309.  The court established a new seven-factor test, under 
which cost-shifting is appropriate as to restoration of inaccessible data if the marginal 
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utility thereof is evinced by a “fact-intensive” review of results of “small sample” 
restoration.  Id. at 324.    
25 Id. at 318-20 (emphasis added). 
26 Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 
27 Painting with a broad brush, the average cost of electronic review ostensibly is lower 
than the average cost of paper review.  See Miranda Glass, “Help Me Help You!” Talking 
Points to Get Colleagues on the E-Discovery Bandwagon, THE APPLIED DISCOVERY 
ORANGE PAGES ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY NEWSL. (Applied Discovery, Bellevue, Wash.), 
Aug. 2003, at 3, at 
http://www.applieddiscovery.com/lawLibrary/newsletter/TheOrangePages_Aug03.pdf 
(reporting that the per page average cost of electronic discovery is $.23, versus $.70 per 
page for paper review).  However, back-up data restoration, manipulation, and review can 
be quite costly.  See, e.g., Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 
8272, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8308 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2002); see also Electronic 
Discovery Survey Center, 2003 eDiscovery in Civil Litigation Survey, at Survey Question 
11, at http://www.ediscoverysurvey.com/question_11.htm (2003) (concluding that more 
than 95% of legal professionals rate the cost of electronic discovery as “somewhat 
challenging” to “very challenging”). 
28 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 318. 
29 See id. at 315-16 (quoting and discussing at length FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37). 
30 Id. at 324. 
31 See generally Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(B)(2)(a)-(c), at 18-24.  For a much more 
technical explication of back-up tapes, see Tom Coughlin, Current Trends in Data 
Storage Backup and Restoration, Coughlin Associates, at 
http://www.tomcoughlin.com/Techpapers/SCU Backup Presentation, 021303.pdf (Feb. 
13, 2003). 
32 Webopedia, Tape Drive, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/T/tape_drive.html (last 
visited Mar. 10, 2004).  This definition was quoted by the court in Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 
at 319 n.55. 
33 In light of new technologies, such as transmission to Storage Area Networks (SAN) or 
Network Attached Storage (NAS), some parties may honestly say they do not have any 
(recent) back-up tapes.  However, for the most part, back-up tapes still comprise the most 
widely used storage medium.  Ian Austen, Storage Methods Come and Go, but Tape 
Holds Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2003, at G8 (“[C]orporations around the world still 
spend billions of dollars annually on tape cartridges that whirl away, backing up data.”). 
34 See, e.g., Linnen v. A. H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
240 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (noting that back-up tapes were recycled every 
three months).  
35 Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note, Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: 
Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 265-66 (2000) (stating that discovery of electronically-stored 
data can be extremely costly relative to hard copies, because companies tend to retain 
greater quantities of it and it tends to linger in storage systems longer). 
36 Back-up tapes are by their nature indiscriminate; “[t]hey capture all information at a 
given time and from a given server but do not catalogue it by subject matter.”  McPeek v. 
Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 33 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter McPeek I].  A “practical 
shortcoming[] [is that] unlike the data on a hard drive or optical disc, the information on 
[a back-up tape] is arranged in linear form.  [The] tape has to be wound backward and 
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forward to retrieve or record data, making it slower in operation.”  Austen, supra note 33, 
at G8. 
37 For example, “[o]nce e-mails have been stored onto backup tapes, the restoration 
process is lengthy.”  Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 314.  Moreover, “[b]ackup tapes also 
typically employ some sort of data compression, permitting more data to be stored on 
each tape, but also making restoration more time-consuming and expensive, especially 
given the lack of uniform standard governing data compression.”  Id. at 319.   
38 Id. at 316.  Under the new approach, step one is to identify inaccessible data, step two 
is to produce a small sample of inaccessible data for review, and step three is to: 
 
conduct[] [a] cost-shifting analysis, [in which] the 
following factors should be considered, weighted 
more-or-less in the following order: 
1. The extent to which the request is specifically 
tailored to discover relevant information; 
2. The availability of such information from other 
sources; 
3. The total cost of production, compared to the 
amount in controversy; 
4. The total cost of production, compared to the 
resources available to each party; 
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs 
and its incentive to do so; 
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the 
litigation; and  
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the 
information. 
 
Id. at 324.  As to the sampling approach, “[l]itigants should consider the use of sampling 
techniques when appropriate to narrow the burden of searching voluminous electronic 
data for relevant information.”  Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 39-40 cmt. 11.b. 
39 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321.  This holding is a more particular application of the 
broad policy increasingly espoused by courts over the past few years that, “[u]pon 
installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at some point in the future one 
may need to retrieve the information previously stored.”  Kaufman v. Kinko’s, Inc., No. 
CIV.A.18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 2002).  “‘[I]f a party 
chooses an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or method is 
an ordinary and foreseeable risk’” of doing business, and the inconvenience and cost of 
retrieval is insufficient to defeat a good faith discovery request.  Id. at *2 n.2 (quoting In 
re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litig., No. 94-C-897, 1995 WL 360526, *2 
(N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995).  Note, though, that the proposed new Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(h)(2), provides in part that “[i]n responding to discovery requests, a party 
need not include electronically-stored data created only for disaster-recovery purposes.”  
Memorandum from Professor Rick Marcus, to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 
33, available at http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus091503a.pdf 
(Sept. 15, 2003). 
40 The Zubulake I court criticized prior decisions for having automatically engaged in 
cost-shifting analysis as a knee-jerk reaction, based on a faulty “assum[ption] that an 
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undue burden or expense may arise simply because electronic evidence is involved.”  Id. 
at 318.  As a matter of policy, Zubulake I noted that “cost-shifting may effectively end 
discovery, especially when private parties are engaged in litigation with large 
corporations.  As large companies increasingly move to entirely paper-free environments, 
the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect of crippling discovery in 
discrimination and retaliation cases.”  Id. at 317-18. 
41 Id. at 324. 
42 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter 
Zubulake III]. 
43 It later turned out that there were only seventy-seven responsive tapes.  Id. at 282. 
44 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. 
46 Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 291.  The Zubulake III court explained that “[t]he more 
likely it is that the backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, 
the fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense.”  Id. at 284.   
Zubulake III also held that, “[a]s a general rule, where cost-shifting is appropriate, only 
the costs of restoration and searching should be shifted. . . .  However, the responding 
party should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data once it has 
been converted to an accessible form.”  Id. at 290. 
47 See, e.g., supra Part IV(D)(4) (discussing Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer 
Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002); McPeek 
v. Ashcroft, 212 F.R.D. 33 (D.D.C. 2003) [hereinafter McPeek II]; McPeek I, 202 F.R.D. 
31 (D.D.C. 2001)).   
48 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 317. 
49 Id. at 312 n.8. 
50 J. Robert Keena, E-Discovery: Unearthing Documents Byte by Byte, BENCH & B. OF 
MINN. (Minn. State Bar, Minneapolis, Minn.), Mar. 2, 2002,  
http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2002/mar02/ediscovery.htm. 
51 The following “real” (though seemingly apocryphal) examples were compiled in an 
article by David S. Bennahum:  
[•]    Yes I know we shipped 100 barrels of [deleted], but on our 
end, steps have been taken to ensure that no record exists.  
Therefore it doesn’t exist.  If you know what I mean.  Remember, 
you owe me a golf game next time I’m in town.  
[•]    Did you see what Dr. [deleted] did today?  If that patient 
survives it will be a miracle. 
David S. Bennahum, Daemon Seed: Old Email Never Dies, WIRED 7.05, 
May 1999, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/7.05/email_pr.html (redactions appear 
in the original article).  See generally supra notes 72-74 and accompanying 
text (discussing John Jessen, whose war stories formed the basis of 
Bennahum’s article).   
52 Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., 10 Mass. L. Rep. 189, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 240 
(Mass. Super. Ct. June 15, 1999). 
53 Keena, supra note 50; Kristin M. Nimsger, Same Game, New Rules: E-discovery Adds 
Complexity to Protecting Clients and Disadvantaging Opponents, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2002, available at http://www.law.com/special/supplement/e_discovery/same_game.html 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004). 
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54 Ann Carrns, Prying Times: Those Bawdy E-Mails Were Good for a Laugh – Until the 
Ax Fell, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2000, at A1 (“[I]n harassment suits[,] [o]ne or two explicit 
e-mail messages typically aren’t enough . . . to prove that a workplace environment was 
hostile.  But such e-mail can bolster other damaging evidence.”). 
55 Where appropriate, especially in a now rare small case, discovery requests “should 
[not] only concentrate on data in its electronic form. . . .  Hard copies may often provide 
invaluable information.  For example, handwritten notes may be written directly on a 
printout of a document . . . .”  Dale M. Cendali et al., Electronic Discovery, in 2 SEVENTH 
ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 615, 626 (Practising Law Institute 2003).  
56 “The term meta data has taken on an unfortunate negative connotation for many legal 
professionals.  In reality, meta data very rarely reveals a ‘smoking gun’ document or 
otherwise harms a litigant’s case.” Davey, supra note 6, at 5.   
57 Electronic Discovery: New Challenges, New Opportunities, supra note 19, at 1. 
58 Some litigators may still be resisting transitioning to electronic discovery tools.  See, 
e.g., Robert D. Brownstone, How to Sway Litigators to Embrace the Electronic Realm, 1 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: DISCOVERY 38 (2004) (suggesting ways to shepherd luddite-like 
litigators into the modern era).  
59 Depending on the nature of the medium and/or the file-type, the calculation of pages 
per gigabyte varies, ranging from approximately 15,000 to around 675,000.  Applied 
Discovery, How Many Pages in a Gigabyte?, at 
http://www.applieddiscovery.com/clientResources/techTips1.asp (last visited Mar. 10,hh 
2004).  While it is true that “[d]ifferent document types will generate very different 
numbers of pages per document and per gigabyte[,] . . . for a given document type, the 
average number of pages produced as compared to the size consumed by the original 
documents stays consistent.”  Id. 
60 Antonucci, supra note 16, at 2.  Some of the many providers of 
collecting/searching/producing services and/or computer forensics services are: Applied 
Discovery, at http://www.applieddiscovery.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); 
Foundstone, at http://www.foundstone.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); Guidance 
Software, at http://www.guidancesoftware.com/services/index.shtm (last visited Mar. 10, 
2003); Kroll Ontrack, at http://www.krollontrack.com/eEvidence (last visited Mar. 10, 
2004); New Technologies, Inc., at http://www.forensics-intl.com/ (last updated Dec. 22, 
2003); and Steelpoint, at http://www.steelpoint.com/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). 
61 Virginia R. Llewellyn, Electronic Discovery Preparedness – The Secret to Success, 
THE METRO. CORP. COUNS. (The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Mountainside, N.J.), 
Dec. 2003, at 40 (“Knowledge of data storage systems benefits the company’s position 
offensively as well, allowing outside counsel to effectively negotiate discovery 
parameters and challenge unduly burdensome requests.”).  For a discussion of the extent 
to which a company may systematically reduce the amount of electronic information it 
retains, see Fenwick, supra note 17, at 4; Cendali et al., supra note 55, at 642.  For a 
discussion of the preservation obligation, see generally Brownstone, supra note 6, § 
II(A), at 2-13. 
62 Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Scheindlin, J.) (first alteration in 
original) (quoting Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal 
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364 (2000)). 
63 In modern litigation, such a data universe typically consists primarily of pure electronic 
files, plus some image files created by scanning and/or OCR’ing hardcopy documents 
that were only found in paper form.  
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64 Lazar, supra note 23, at 14 (defining a “box” as an “average banker’s box [that] holds 
2,500 sheets of paper, and one page of information on average equals [twenty] kilobytes 
(.02 megabytes)”).  Note that .02 is a conservative page-to-data size conversion factor, 
because data-intensive e-mails and/or spreadsheets may have factors of .01 or .005 
megabytes.  See id.    
65 DocFinity, Saving the Environment One Tree at a Time; The Environmental Impact of 
Electronic Document Management, DOCUMENT MAGAZINE, Oct. 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.dptmag.com/editorial2.asp?ID=152 (last visited Apr. 2, 2004) (estimating 
that one tree is roughly equivalent to 8,000 pages) (citing CLAUDIA THOMPSON, 
RECYCLED PAPERS: THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE (MIT Press 1992)). 
66 See, e.g., Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-981-RRM, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7792 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2002) (demonstrating the consequences of a 
defendant’s ongoing stonewalling); see also discussion supra Part IV(D)(4). 
67 Tom McCann, Electronic Discovery Becomes Hot Topic in Legal Tech, CHI. LAW., 
Oct. 2003, at 43 (“The last thing you want . . . is to be overwhelmed by a deluge of data.  
Make specified searches to create a subset of data, sufficiently small so that both sides 
have time to review it.  Some opposing counsel are reluctant . . . .  But I’ve always been 
successful at negotiating a reasonable narrowing of the data.”). 
68 Nimsger & Lange, supra note 5 (“Native data refers to documents still in the original 
file format in which they were created (i.e., in the specific software applications used to 
create each individual document).”).   
69 Id. (discussing the various disadvantages and advantages of native review). 
70 Id.  “In most cases, the limitations associated with native file review - potential for 
spoliation, searching limitations and inability to redact - is driving a choice of review 
method toward data conversion [plus] online repository review.”  Id.   An even earlier 
hurdle may be that those same limitations restrict the producing party’s counsel’s pre-
production review of native documents.  See, e.g., Jones v. Goord, No. 95-CIV-8026, 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2002) (demonstrating how practical 
considerations seemed to hamstring a judge who might otherwise have required 
Defendant to produce “data in electronic, manipulable form [to] facilitate expert 
analysis”).  Goord is discussed in detail in Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(D)(3), at 30-31.  
71 Sedona Principles, supra note 3, § 11, at 39. 
72 John Jessen, Electronic Discovery Issue #1 at 1 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Richmond Journal of Law & Technology). 
73 Id. at 2. 
74 See id. at 4. 
75 In the author’s experience, legal software initially developed before the recent 
electronic data explosion has not successfully reinvented itself to accommodate vast e-
Discovery data sets.  To fill the void, many new vendors have sprung up, purporting to 
offer vehicles that successfully navigate e-Discovery.  Few providers offer services that 
even purport to be powerful enough to tackle enormous data sets.  Ostensibly, “[a] 
handful of companies, such as startup Fios, Applied Discovery, and Kroll OnTrack . . . 
offer specific services . . . that catalog and categorize massive numbers of files.”  Alex 
Salkever, A Supercharged Search Engine for Lawyers, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, June 25, 
2003, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com:/print/technology/content/jun2003/tc20030625_5288_tc04
7.htm?tc In those few putatively more robust applications, “[f]iles are organized by type, 
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date, keyword, and other criteria that provide far more capability to search for complex 
terms and patterns than on the average Web search engine.”  Id.   
76 See, e.g., Cendali et al., supra note 55, at 626 (detailing the 
capabilities of various search software).  See generally Joan Feldman, 
Effective Data Searches, Computer Forensics Inc., at 
http://www.forensics.com/pdf/Effective_Data_Searches.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
77 For an excellent summary of some of the pros and cons on this issue, see Jessen, supra 
note 72, at 2.  
78 Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at iv.  The Sedona Principles also recognized that 
“[e]ach . . . aspect[] of discovery should be considered in light of the nature of the 
litigation and the amount in controversy, as well as the cost, burden, and disruption to 
parties’ operations.”  Id.  
79 Cf. id. (“Electronic discovery is a tool to help resolve a dispute and should not be 
viewed as a strategic weapon to coerce unjust, delayed, or expensive results.”).  
80 If inaccessible data is worthy of discovery, then - once it “has been converted to an 
accessible form” - it should be treated just like accessible data for all e-Discovery 
purposes.  Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. 280, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Restoration . . . is the act 
of making inaccessible material accessible.  That ‘special purpose’ or ‘extraordinary step’ 
should be the subject of cost-shifting. . . .  However, [post-conversion,] the responding 
party should always bear the cost of reviewing and producing electronic data.”). 
81 Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 8 n.12 (“[E-Discovery] disputes are most likely to 
arise and require court intervention when the burdens of preservation and production are 
disproportionate among the litigants . . . .”).  The Zubulake approach intentionally sought 
to narrow the circumstances in which a corporate producing party can shift costs onto an 
individual requesting party.  Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  On 
the other side of the coin, to avoid fishing expeditions by individuals, the Zubulake 
approach makes a requesting party clear a marginal utility hurdle before it can get at 
relatively inaccessible data.  Id. at 323.   
82 In late 2003, an appellate decision denied “unlimited, direct access to [Defendant]’s 
databases” because the trial “court [had] established no protocols for the search . . . [and] 
did not even designate search terms to restrict the search.”  In re Ford Motor Co., 345 
F.3d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (vacating discovery order).  One commentator has 
described the Ford holding as interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 to “allow 
the responding party to search its own records to produce the required, relevant data . . . 
[but] not give the requesting party the right to conduct the actual search.” Blouin, supra 
note 4.
83 For a discussion of the apparent judicial tendency to appoint a neutral expert to copy 
hard drives and to attempt to recover deleted data, see Brownstone, supra note 6, § II(C), 
at 25-27; Simon Prop. Group L.P. v. MySimon, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 639, 641 (S.D. Ind. 
2000) (appointing neutral expert to recover “deleted” files from computers, including 
home computers, used by Defendant’s employees), supplemented by No. IP.99-1195-C 
H/G, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8953 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2000); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff'd in part & rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (appointing neutral expert to copy Defendant’s 
personal computer hard drive, due to evidence of Defendant’s deletion of e-mails 
responsive to Plaintiff’s document production request and likelihood of recovery).  
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84 See, e.g., Christopher D. Wall & Michele C. S. Lange, Electronic Discovery: Recent 
Developments, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2003,  
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/washington_lawyer/march_2003/electronic.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2004) ( “Simply booting a computer can possibly destroy valuable 
metadata . . . that could be relevant in a lawsuit”) (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook 
Borders. Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 652-54 (D. Minn. 2002)). 
85 Llewellyn, supra note 61, at 40 (“The basic legal framework for electronic discovery is 
the same as that for paper documents, with the rules of discovery providing expansive 
access to an opposing party’s electronic data.”). 
86 Electronic Evidence – A Big Issue With No Easy Solutions, THE METRO. CORP. COUNS. 
(The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Mountainside, N.J.), Dec. 2003, at 48 (editor’s 
interview with BASF Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Thomas Y. Allman) 
[hereinafter Allman]. 
87 Practitioner Reacts to 2nd Circuit Electronic Discovery Decision, FED. DISCOVERY 
NEWS, Dec. 16, 2002 (quoting Alan Blakely, chair of Federal Bar Association’s Federal 
Litigation Section).   
88 Allman, supra note 86, at 48.  But see Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. 
Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).  
89 See, e.g., Wright v. AmSouth Bancorp., 320 F.3d 1198, 1205 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(affirming denial of discovery after “review[ing] district court’s rulings on discovery 
issues for an abuse of discretion”). 
90 See, e.g., Metro. Opera Ass’n v. Local 100, Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l 
Union,, 212 F.R.D. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).   
91 The interim website for the pertinent materials can be found at Ken Withers, Discovery 
Subcommittee Letter on Electronic Discovery and Responses, at 
http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules (last visited Mar. 3, 2004). 
92 Robert A. Clifford, Court Addresses Electronic Discovery, CHI. LAW., July 2003, at 22 
(“[2002’s] survey on electronic discovery [went out] to 150 lawyers, bar organizations 
and technical people seeking input on whether federal rules are adequate to ensure that 
discovery is predictable.”).   
93 Among the doubters is BASF General Counsel Thomas Y. Allman, interviewed in 
Electronic Evidence – A Big Issue with No Easy Solutions, supra note 87, at 48.  
“Drafting rules in this area is difficult.  If you make them too specific, the pace of 
technological development may make the rules obsolete in a short time.  On the other 
hand, if you make them too general, they are not really adding to the body of law.”  Id.   
94 Marcus, supra note 39, at 5.   
95 Id. at 11-12.  The proposed amendment tentatively states, intentionally vaguely, that 
“for electronically-stored data,” requests for production may cover “all data stored or 
maintained on that document {if the court so orders for good cause}.”  Id. at 11.  Specific 
references to metadata and “embedded data” are in the proposed Committee Note 
regarding this addition.  Marcus, supra note 39, at 12.  The committee has not yet reached 
a consensus on this issue, especially in the context of inaccessible data.  See id. at 12.   
96 Id. at 14.  
97 Id. at 24-30 (discussing the pros and cons of alternative provisions in this regard). 
98 Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 16; see also John L. Carroll, Observations on the 
“Sedona Principles,” at 4, at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/miscFiles/carroll (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2004) (“In the field of electronic discovery, we believe this principle 
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states the central lesson of the current case law, the commentary in the legal press, and 
the discussions in rulemaking circles.”). 
99 Carroll, supra note 98, at 5.  Principle Six appears at first glance to aid responders, in 
that it provides that “[r]esponding parties are best situated to evaluate the procedures, 
methodologies and technologies appropriate for preserving and producing their own 
electronic data and documents.”  Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 27.  However, the 
corresponding “Observation” contains a significant qualifying “corollary,” namely that 
“responding parties are responsible for the reasonably anticipated consequences of their 
choices.  The corollary applies if a party has a history of discovery sanctions or if it has 
no reliable electronic document management procedures.”  Carroll, supra note 98, at 5.  
Plus, even Sedona Principle Six itself cites a case where preservation efforts were grossly 
insufficient.  See Danis v. USN Communications, Inc., No. 98-C-7482, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16900, at *13-14 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) (criticizing parties for failure to 
communicate or to gain “complete mastery of what types of documents were generated 
by [Defendant] in the ordinary course of business, how they were used, or their 
significance”). 
100 Carroll, supra note 98, at 5. 
101 Sedona Principles, supra note 3, at 39.   
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 Carroll, supra note 98, at 8 (emphasis added).  
104 The proposed e-Discovery-related amendments are posted along with a cover letter 
seeking comments.  See Task Force on Electronic Discovery, American Bar Association 
Section of Litigation, November 2003 Draft Amendments to Electronic Discovery 
Standards, at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/document.pdf (Nov. 
17, 2003) [hereinafter ABA Draft Amendments].  The highlights of the proposed changes 
are summarized by a Co-Chair of the Task Force.  See Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic 
Discovery, 26 NAT’L L.J 19 (Nov. 24, 2003).  
105 See, e.g., ABA Draft Amendments, supra note 104, at 7-9 standard 31(a)(xi), (b)(i)-
(iii); see also Joseph, supra note 103, at 19.   
106 ABA Draft Amendments, supra note 104, at 10 standard 32(a)-(c); see also Joseph, 
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153 Id. at *19.  The Court states: 
 
The history of [Defendant’s] failures to cooperate in 
the discovery process . . . favor . . . awarding 
[Plaintiffs] some relief that allows them to ascertain 
for themselves whether [Defendant’s] representations 
. . . are accurate.  Moreover, counsel for [Defendant] 
could not represent to the court that it has thoroughly 
searched these e-mail records for responsive 
information. 
 
Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id.  The court did, however, draw the line at the Dell Chief Executive Officer.  Id. at 
*20 n.2 (“The only link that Tulip can point to between Michael Dell and any issue in this 
case is an e-mail from Michael Dell to another Dell executive, stating that he was happy 
that his project was completed.”).   
156 Id. at *19. 
157 Docket Report, Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., No. 00-CV-981, 
at 49 (D. Del. July 10, 2003), available at 
https://pacer.ded.uscourts.gov/dc/pacer150.html (subscription required) (on file with 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology). 
158 Cf. YANN MARTEL, LIFE OF PI (Harvest Books 2003). 
159 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 566 (1851) (with apologies to the author).  
